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DISCOURSE and INTERACTION 4/2/2011
AN INTERVIEW WITH PETER GRUNDY
Interviewer: Martin Adam
This interview was conducted in relation to Peter Grundy’s keynote lecture 
Use and Usage given at the Faculty of Education, Masaryk University, Brno in 
September 2011. 
Peter Grundy specialises in pragmatics and applied linguistics. His book 
Doing Pragmatics is now in its third edition; his two most recent books are The 
Pragmatics Reader with Dawn Archer (Routledge, 2011), and English through 
Art with Hania Bociek and Kevin Parker (Helbling Languages, 2011). He is 
currently working on a Pragmatics Handbook.
Peter Grundy taught in schools in the UK and Germany for fi ve years and 
worked in higher education as a teacher trainer for six years before taking up 
a post at the University of Durham in 1979. Apart from a two-year period at 
the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, he taught pragmatics and applied 
linguistics at Durham until 2002, when he took early retirement. Since then, he 
has taught on a part-time basis at several universities, most recently as a visiting 
professor at University of Vienna during the 2011-12 winter semester. He is a 
past president of IATEFL and currently chairs the IATEFL Wider Membership 
Scheme Committee.
MA: Peter, you travel around the world, visit conferences, give lectures 
and present your research. Did you enjoy the ELT Signposts 2011 conference in 
Brno? What did you fi nd special about it?
PG: Yes, I enjoyed the conference a lot and learned a great deal too. Besides 
stimulating sessions, for me the good things included excellent organization, 
warm and generous hospitality – especially at the evening events, and the size of 
the conference, with enough delegates for variety but not so many as to make me 
feel like a footnote in a manuscript. I’m ashamed to say that apart from one quick 
car journey across the Czech Republic many years ago, this was my fi rst visit, so 
that for me, there was the added interest of seeing everything for the fi rst time. 
This was particularly striking in Prague, where I spent the afternoon and evening 
before the conference. Returning on Sunday afternoon when the conference was 
over, I noticed so many more things about the buildings in particular that I hadn’t 
spotted just three days earlier. Sadly, there wasn’t time to explore Brno beyond a 
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walk up the road to the Augustinian Abbey in the lunch-hour, where I especially 
admired the modern stained glass in the window above the south door.
MA: Your main fi eld of professional interest seems to be related to 
pragmatics. How would you explain what pragmatics is about? 
PG: I think there may be two questions here: What is pragmatics? and 
What makes an utterance pragmatic? The second question is easier, so I’ll try 
and answer that one fi rst.
It’s often said that what makes utterances pragmatic is their relation to the 
context in which they occur. So if I say to you on Tuesday afternoon something 
like ‘We had a salad for lunch’, you’ll think my use of the past tense refers to a 
time earlier on that day, whereas if I say the same thing on Wednesday afternoon, 
you’ll think I’m referring to a time earlier on Wednesday, and so on. Because 
they (almost) always index or point to aspects of the context in which they occur, 
we call this property of utterances ‘indexicality’. Our utterances are indexical 
not only in relation to time and place, but also in relation to social context, so 
that whereas I might say to a friend we had a salad, I might be more likely to use 
a formula like we had a light lunch in a more formal setting. Leading on from 
this, you don’t have to think very hard to realise that even the simplest words 
mean different things depending on the context they index. For example, if I’m a 
student and I say ‘I told my lecturer about the assignment’, I probably don’t use 
told to mean the same thing as a lecturer does when saying ‘I told my students 
about the assignment’.
Another way in which context affects meaning is to act as a trigger for 
pragmatic strengthening. So if I said that I’d had a salad for lunch, the person I 
was speaking to would enrich my utterance by adding ‘today’. But it goes much 
further than this since I’d be unlikely to say ‘We had a salad for lunch’ merely to 
convey that simple piece of information. I might, for example, be contributing to 
a discussion about what to eat in the evening and hoping that my friends would 
infer that I was hungry.
This leads me on to the second way in which utterances are pragmatic – they 
invite inferences. Because these inferences are usually linked to context in some 
way, they also vary with that context, so if you knew that I was on a diet, my 
saying ‘We had a salad for lunch’ might cause you to infer that I’d been strict 
with myself. This is a very useful aspect of human language because it enables 
us to put the same sentences to many different uses, as in the case of the ‘salad’ 
sentence. In fact, when you think about it, anything we say can mean almost 
anything we want it to, given the right context.
Despite what I’ve just said, it’s also possible to think of pragmatic inferences 
that have nothing to do with context but seem to be related to the way we put 
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things. So in my talk, I distinguished ‘nice and warm’ (inference – nice because 
warm) from ‘rich and caring’ (inference – caring despite being rich).
If we turn to the second question What is pragmatics? we fi nd a wide 
range of opinions, largely depending on how we react to the kinds of examples 
I mentioned before. Some pragmaticians are interested in indexicality, and in 
particular how language refl ects aspects of social context such as power, or 
gender, or whether the speaker is a fi rst, second or foreign language user. Others 
are interested in cognition and how we represent pragmatic inferences in the 
mind – if a simple utterance like we had a salad for lunch is capable of triggering 
a virtually unlimited number of contextual effects, what does this tell us about 
cognition? Pragmaticians who study utterances in this way are contributing to 
what’s usually called ‘theory of mind’. We can contrast this approach with that of 
yet another group of (more traditional) pragmaticians who are interested in how 
well-established areas in philosophy like, for example, intention, are realised in 
the language we use. Such pragmaticians are contributing to what’s usually called 
‘philosophy of mind’. Despite the differences between such approaches, what 
they all have in common is an interest in natural language use and a recognition 
that what we mean is rarely only what we say.
Having answered these two questions, I’d like to add a further thought, which 
is this: we can’t always leave understanding what we say only to our interlocutors’ 
cognitive ability and encyclopaedic knowledge of contexts, although we do of 
course try and say only things that we think they will understand. I don’t know 
about Czech, but in English, and many other languages, speakers can use the 
word then not only to refer to a moment in time earlier than the time of the 
utterance, but also to mark agreement. For example, imagine we are discussing 
whether to order red or white wine – some of us favour one, some the other. 
Eventually, someone says ‘Red then’, intending to convey that there’s a general 
agreement that we should go for red. If the speaker had simply said ‘Red’, we 
wouldn’t have known that they were suggesting that agreement had been reached. 
So we sometimes need to indicate to others how we would like our utterances 
to be understood, as with the use of then in this example. In fact, you may have 
noticed that my use of ‘so’ at the beginning of the last sentence works in the same 
kind of way and is intended to encourage you to understand the sentence as a 
kind of conclusion of the argument I’ve been advancing – similarly (sorry, done 
it again!), you may have noticed how ‘in fact’ at the beginning of this sentence 
also has a metapragmatic function. Of course (sorry, done it yet again!), markers 
like then, so, in fact, similarly and (of course) of course are very obvious ways 
of signalling how we want what we say to be understood. You might want to 
argue that all language has a metapragmatic dimension, as the earlier example 
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of told seems to suggest: something is conveyed by told that wouldn’t have 
been conveyed by explained, and whichever word is used, each different invited 
interpretation also depends on whether the conversation goes in the student → 
lecturer or lecturer → student direction.
Finally, notice how narrowly I’ve answered your question, focusing only on the 
way social scientists, linguists and linguistic philosophers approach pragmatics. 
Pragmatism could also be seen as a crucial concept in many other areas, including, 
for a start, evolution (biology), linguistic and non-linguistic communication 
(semiotics), ethnography (anthropology), development (psychology), perception 
and cognition (psychology) and artifi cial intelligence (computer science).
MA: Can we teach pragmatics to our students at the Faculty of Education, 
Masaryk University? What should be the main points? How can pragmatics be 
practical in terms of their future teaching careers?
PG: Well (you see from my metapragmatic beginning that I’m probably 
not going to give you the kind of direct answer that you hoped for), your question 
begs a question – even assuming it to be possible to teach pragmatics, which your 
metapragmatic stress on ‘teach’ perhaps puts in doubt anyway. And that question 
is: do we want to? I know there’s a great deal of quasi-experimental literature 
which suggests that explicit teaching has a positive effect, but I don’t really see 
how the term ‘L2 pragmatics’, which I mentioned in my talk in relation to a recent 
book I’d been reading (actually, Ishihara and Cohen’s Teaching and Learning 
Pragmatics), makes much sense. Learning to apologise like someone else seems 
to me to be no more than learning a few pragmalinguistic tricks, or put more 
simply, learning the formulas that someone (else) might use. This isn’t really 
learning pragmatics at all, but rather learning a set of formulaic vocabulary, a 
kind of decontextualized pragmatics (which I suppose ought to be a contradictory 
notion). Now I say ‘learning’ as if ‘learning (a set of formulaic) vocabulary’ were 
an unproblematic notion, which of course it isn’t, but unfortunately I can’t go 
into this here, although when the IATEFL Selections volume from the Brighton 
conference in 2011 comes out at the beginning of next year, you can read my 
attempt to rubbish the vocabulary teaching literature there!
MA: On a more personal note, how do you succeed in interconnecting your 
career and your private life?
PG: Those of us who are fortunate enough to work in higher education 
have a high degree of self-determination not only in what we do and how we 
do it, but also in when we do it. When we had a young family, my wife and 
I were able to juggle schools, playgroups, crèches and child minders and still 
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have quite a lot of time with our children precisely because we worked in higher 
education.
But to return to your question, having taken my pension in 2002, my career 
is now over. However, since retiring, I’ve taken to doing quite a lot of travelling 
and occasional teaching, which means that I’m away from home for short periods 
several times a year. I think in general short periods of time apart are quite good 
for a marriage, and as long as my wife gets a nice present when I come home, 
she’ll let me come to Brno again. I know that I’m rather breaking with custom 
at present with a four-month appointment in Vienna, but I will be home for brief 
periods each month as well as at Christmas.
MA:  In your plenary lecture, you were dealing with the concepts of use 
and usage; when hearing these two terms, two other notions come into my mind: 
fi rst, the Saussurean dichotomies and the Praguian idea of e.g. phonology and 
phonetics, and, second, Henry Widdowson’s distinction. Can you say a few 
words on your understanding of use and usage?
PG:  Yes, I see that in this country I will have looked like an accidental 
structuralist. And what I’ve just said about tell and explain may also make it look 
this way too. In a way, your question helps me to clarify what I was trying to 
say in my talk because the abstraction from phonetics that phonology represents 
isn’t at all like the relationship, if it exists at all, of use and usage that I was 
talking about. I was distinguishing ‘types’ – repeated instances of pragmatic (i.e. 
inferred) meaning, which I called usage principally because I wanted to invoke 
Widdowson’s famous distinction, from ‘tokens’ – context-dependent instances 
of pragmatic meaning, which, again in imitation of Widdowson, I called use. So 
usage isn’t an abstraction from use at all, not an underlying system that explains 
and predicts all and only the possible instances of use. In the way I was using 
the terms, usage captures default inference irrespective of context, whereas I 
was using use to describe instances of language whose interpretation varies 
with context. Broadly – but not exactly, because, as we know, there’s been a 
great deal of debate around the periphery – this is the same distinction that Grice 
hinted at a long time ago when he distinguished generalized and particularized 
conversational implicature.
Early in my talk I raised the issue of what the default usage would be in a 
unique context, that of asking about the gender of the only surviving identical 
quadruplets in Britain, and tried to suggest that the use/usage distinction was 
problematical in such cases. By extension, the use/usage distinction should, in 
my view, be problematized in language teaching too – why shouldn’t individual 
learners fi nd uses particular to themselves irrespective of someone else’s usage 
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preference? Which brings us to the second part of your question, and Henry 
Widdowson, the author in 1972 of, arguably, the fi rst article about what we now 
call communicative language teaching. He was distinguishing between ‘knowing 
what is involved in putting sentences together correctly’, which he called usage 
or signifi cation, and ‘a knowledge of what sentences count as in their normal 
use as a means of communicating’, which he called use or value, and making 
the point that language teaching was oriented to the former at the expense of the 
latter. If you like, he was distinguishing literal meaning (which he called usage) 
from speech acts (which he called use), whereas I was distinguishing default 
inference and nonce inference. If either of us is a structuralist, it may be him, 
although I must say that I don’t much like this way of thinking about semantics 
and pragmatics either.
MA:  Is a modern teacher of English to teach the use rather than the usage, 
then?
PG:  The job of a teacher is to give learners the opportunity to use 
language in ways that are particular to themselves. This isn’t actually Henry 
Widdowson’s argument at all (although he might well subscribe to it), and in fact 
the argument he advances is precisely the kind of argument that’s led some so-
called communicative language teachers, especially those who rely on speech act 
dominated coursebooks, to deny learners the opportunity to use language in ways 
that are particular to themselves. Of course, no coursebook author wants to work 
with tokens precisely because they don’t generalize over other instances of use. 
In the real world, a proportion of what we say is ‘typical’ and a proportion isn’t. 
For obvious reasons, you can’t ‘teach’ that non-typical proportion, but you can 
facilitate the use of context-dependent language in your classrooms. In my talk, 
I explained that the concept triggered in my wife’s mind by my use of ‘back’ in 
the utterance ‘I should be back by eight but you know what trains are like’ varied 
depending on the day of the day of the week. I don’t see why learners can’t be 
given opportunities to use words to trigger concepts intended by themselves and 
quite unlike those intended by other learners, or even by themselves on other 
occasions.
Please don’t take it amiss when I say that for me the use of ‘teach’ in the 
question is problematic. We all agree that there’s a gap between what the teacher 
knows and what the learner knows. If the teacher tries to fi ll this gap, we call it 
‘teaching’, but if we’re skilled enough to set things up so that the learner fi lls the 
gap, then we call it ‘learning’. 
MA:  How can awareness of implicature (both on the part of the teacher and 
the students) affect our ELT practice?
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PG:  As it happens, I’ve just fi nished struggling with a paper on the topic 
of language awareness, which I was rash enough to talk about at TESOL Arabia 
earlier this year. My two principle arguments were that there’s a great deal of 
talk about language awareness in the literature but virtually no one provides any 
evidence of the phenomenon. However, if we look at pragmatics, implicatures 
are a prime kind of evidence because if they are responded to, there must be 
awareness of them even though they operate at the level of inference. This leads 
to the second argument, that talk about awareness as a form of ‘consciousness’, 
as is typical in the literature, is (a) problematic because we don’t know what 
consciousness is and (b) misleading if treated as a criterial property of awareness 
because we are only tacitly aware of most aspects of language use, including 
pragmatics. So the question is perhaps about the extent to which it’s useful to raise 
awareness of implicature. That’s fi ne by me so long as we don’t end up teaching 
our learners about implicature instead of providing them with opportunities to 
communicate implicatures.
MA:  Students will know your book Doing Pragmatics; what are your 
publication plans for the nearest future?
PG:  The fi rst part of your question is kind but may not be strictly true! But 
can we pause a moment on the title, which by the way was thought up by a clever 
editor and which I was too dim to have thought of for myself. Bearing in mind 
what we’ve been saying about putative notions like ‘teaching pragmatics’ and 
‘learning pragmatics’, ‘doing pragmatics’ does seem like a good idea (although 
of course I may not have succeeded in this aim to any great degree in the book). 
As to future plans, I’m currently working with Anne Barron (Luneburg) and 
Gu Yueguo (Beijing) on a pragmatics handbook. This project is still at an early 
stage, but I’m already excited because it seems to me that the existing handbooks 
are either several volumes long or too diffi cult for student readers or both (and, 
of course, too expensive). We hope our handbook will sell well enough for the 
publisher to produce a paperback edition which will then supplant the many 
pragmatics textbooks, including Doing Pragmatics!
Finally, thank you for asking me these questions. Having to think out the 
answers has been a very useful experience, more useful for me probably than the 
answers will be for your readers.
